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THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: A NEW
REASONABLENESS TEST FOR VIEWING
SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS
Men and women are frequently subjected to different rules in the
law and society. The American legal system currently contains forms
of common law principles which result in irrational discrimination on
the basis of sex and articulation of a national policy against sex dis-
crimination has not yet been voiced by the judicial system.
On March 22, 1972, the following constitutional amendment was
submitted by Congress to the legislatures of the states for ratification:'
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the
date of ratification.
The Equal Rights Amendment2 culminates an effort begun in 1923
to forbid federal and state laws which discriminate on the basis of
sex.3 On four other occasions the Amendment4 has received serious
congressional consideration, but failed due to doubts concerning the
1. "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution .... which .... shall be valid to
all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures
of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as
the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; ....
U.S. CONST. art. V.
2. S. J. Res. 8, 92d Cong. Ist Sess. (1971). See U.S. Code Cong. & Ad News
835 (April 20, 1972) [hereinafter cited as USCCAN].
3. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS TO THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 32 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CCPR].
4. The form of the Amendment has remained unchanged since 1943. The four
other occasions on which the Amendment received consideration were: 1946, 1950,
1953 and 1970. See generally Brown, Emerson, Falk and Freedman, The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis For Equal Rights For Women, 80 YALE L.J.
871 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown]; Bayh, The Equal Rights Amendment, 6 IND.
L REV. 1 (1972).
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meaning of the concept of "equality"." The divergent views ex-
pressed by members of the House Committee on the Judiciary demon-
strate that considerable uncertainty still remains regarding the concept
of equality,6 and indicate that the debates in the state legislatures will
involve such questions as: Is equality of rights with regard to sex suf-
ficiently protected by the fourteenth amendment Equal Protection
Clause, or, is specific recognition necessary? If specific recognition of
sexual equality is needed, is a constitutional amendment mandatory, or
in the alternative, would a statute serve the same purpose? If a con-
stitutional amendment is mandatory, what test will be applied to legis-
lation to determine if the Amendment has been violated? And finally,
what impact will the Equal Rights Amendment have on existing law?
Arguments for and against passage of the Amendment have cen-
tered around the possibility that sexual equality will be found to be in-
cluded within the scope of the fourteenth amendment. 7  The United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause,
therefore, is crucial to deciding if specific recognition of sexual equality
is needed.
Most of the early proponents of equal rights for men and women ar-
gued that equal status under law could best be achieved by judicial in-
clusion of sex discrimination under the protection afforded by the
Equal Protection Clause.8 It was believed that the genius of the Con-
stitution, with its capacity through judicial interpretation for growth
and adaptation to changing conditions and human values, would pro-
vide sufficient protection against sex discrimination.9
The Court has not developed a precise formulation of the concept
of equal protection; rather, it has continued to hold that the fourteenth
amendment permits the states a wide scope of discretion in enacting
laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others.' 0
5. See generally Martin, Equal Rights Amendment: Legislative Background, 11J. FAMILY L. 363 (1971).
6. See for example USCCAN, at 845. For a general discussion of the concept
of "equality", see Note, Sex Discrimination And Equal Protection: Do We Need A
Constitutional Amendment, 84 H.Av. L. REv. 1499 (1971).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. See Kanowitz, Constitutional Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination in American
Law, 48 NEB. L. REV. 131 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kanowitz]; Note, Classification
on the Basis of Sex and The 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50 IowA L. REv. 778 (1965);
Note, Are Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 481(1971). The possibility of judicial inclusion of sexual equality under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause was the hope of the Committee on Civil and Political Rights. See
CCPR, at 36, 37. See also Brown, supra note 4, at 875.
9. Murray and Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title
VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 237 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Murray & Eastwood].
10. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Allied Stores of Ohio,
Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527, 528 (1959).
Vol. 4: 69
Equal Rights Amendment
The constitutional safeguard is violated only at the point at which the
classification made becomes "palpably arbitrary", 1 or constitutes an
"invidious discrimination". 12 Since the only requirement enunciated
by the Court is that the classification must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation in which it appears, 3 such a classification will not be found
offensive to equal protection if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it. 4 The Court has warned that the broad lan-
guage of the Equal Protection Clause will not be stretched to dryly
logical extremes,"5 nor interpreted divorced from its historical roots.'"
Although sometimes used to protect against other types of discrimina-
tion, the Court has on several occasions been cautioned that the four-
teenth amendment was designed primarily to prohibit the states from
discriminating against persons on account of their race and, therefore,
cannot be expanded to prohibit every discrimination between groups of
people.' 7  Thus, the formulation of the equal protection concept to
date demonstrates that absolute equality between classes of persons is
not required.
The nature of the scrutiny which sex discrimination has received is
revealed in the reasoning of Reed v. Reed.' Reed presented the
Court with a challenge to an Idaho statute which gave preference to
the father in the administration of a deceased child's estate. Speaking
for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger found that in the context
of administration of estates, the mandatory statutory male preference
could not be justified solely on the basis of sex and was therefore viola-
tive of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court's opinion will likely be remembered more for what it
omitted than what it contained.' 9 In addition to providing little or no
guidance to lower courts to aid them in dealing with the "welter of
discordant decisions '2° already brought under various claims of sex
11. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959).
12. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963). See also Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
13. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959).
14. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
15. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911). See also Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); USCCAN, at 849.
16. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465 (1948).
17. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 126, 127 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 275 (1970) [Black, J., dissenting]. See also Murray & Eastwood, at 235.
18. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). cf. Buchas v. Illinois High School Assn., 41 U.S.L.W.
2277 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1972).
19. See 1972 Wis. L. REv. 626 (1972).
20. Id. at 631.
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discrimination, the failure of the Court to consider the possibility of a
legitimate state interest in the administration of estates raises serious
doubt as to the real basis for the Court's decision. The Court made
no effort to discuss and clarify the problem of whether classification
on the basis of sex was inherently "suspect" and subject to a more
rigid standard of scrutiny by the Court,2 or, whether sexual equality
was in the nature of a basic civil right and subject to a presumption
of invalidity absent a clear and convincing demonstration by the state
of an overriding purpose or interest.22 Finally, if Reed reflects a
standard of review which requires that the classification merely be rea-
sonable, the Court did not clarify what made this particular classifica-
tion unreasonable as opposed to those classifications based on sex
which have been sustained in the past.23
The reasoning process used to arrive at the holding in Reed, coupled
with the rather conclusory language of the opinion, suggest that the
Court did not intend the case to further the proposition that sex dis-
crimination was per se included within the Equal Protection Clause
of the fourteenth amendment.2 ' Not only did Reed fail to place sexual
equality squarely within the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
avoided an opportunity to eliminate confusion when analyzing legisla-
tion that adopts classifications based upon sex. Reed therefore,
strongly suggests that there is little likelihood that the Court will apply
the Equal Protection Clause in a manner that will effectively guarantee
equality without regard to sex. 25
21. The term "suspect" was first used by Justice Black, writing for the majority
in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Classifications generally
deemed "suspect" are those involving characteristics over which the individual has
no control-race, alienage, wealth, illegitimacy-and which are seldom descriptive
of an individual's capacities or propensities. For a list of those classifications held
"suspect" see note 48 infra.
22. "Basic" civil rights, variously termed "fundamental interests" or "fundamental
rights", are those rights which attach to a person by the mere fact of citizenship. Such
rights have generally been seen to emanate from the rights already enumerated in the
Bill of Rights. For a list of those rights held "basic" see note 50 infra.
23. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915); Miller v. Wilson,
236 U.S. 373 (1915); Hawley v. Walker, 232 U.S. 718 (1914); Riley v. Massachusetts,
232 U.S. 671 (1914); United States v. Caci, 401 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. den.
394 U.S. 917 (1969). See also Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924); Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
24. This suggestion is further confirmed by the decision in Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625 (1972), where the Court refused to reach the issue of sex discrimination
in the selection of juries.
25. Similar conclusions were reached prior to the decision in Reed by other
commentators. See Brown, supra, note 4 at 875; Murray & Eastwood, supra note 9, at
236; Note, supra, note 6, at 1502. See generally Griffiths, The Law Must Reflect The
New Image of Women, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Griffiths].
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If specific recognition of sexual equality is necessary to guarantee
equality of rights between the sexes, legislative solutions to discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex have apparently not fulfilled this need. One
example of legislation that has not filled this constitutional gap is Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.26
Title VII prohibits employers, employment agencies and labor or-
ganizations in industries affecting commerce from discriminating on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin in their employ-
ment practices. Despite the fact that Title VII has served as the basis
for some significant challenges to present employment discrimination
practices, it also contains serious shortcomings which have diluted its
remedial effect. For example, Title VII is limited to employers of
twenty-five persons or more, exempts educational institutions 7 and
government agencies, and permits discrimination on the basis of sex
where gender is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably ne-
cessary to the normal operation of a particular business or enterprise.2"
Moreover, the agency created by the Act to administer the Title and
set guidelines for employers-the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission-has no enforcement powers to compel adherence to its
rulings and, therefore, the Commission must resort to the courts for
enforcement.29
The treatment which the Title has received in the courts has accentu-
ated what might be considered its inherent defects. The presence of
the reasonableness test in the Act has permitted a wide divergence of
opinion among courts as to the types of sex classifications which are
permissible within Title VIL °  The easy availability of the bona fide
occupational qualification exception, as interpreted by courts, has
evoked the criticism that the exception might be construed so as to
swallow the rule."' And, notwithstanding the fact that the United
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (1964). The Act rests for its authority upon the
Equal Protection and Enforcement Clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and upon
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. See generally Note, Classifica-
tion on the Basis of Sex and The 1964 Civil Rights Act, supra, note 8; Note, Civil
Rights Act of 1964: An Exception to Prohibitions on Employment Discrimination,
55 IowA L. REV. 509 (1969).
27. But see P.L. No. 92-261 (March 8, 1972). USCCAN, at 814.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15. For an example of EEOC guidelines, see 29
C.F.R. § 1604.4 (1969), interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1964).
30. Note, Civil Rights Act of 1964: An Exception to Prohibitions on Employment
Discrimination, supra, note 26, at 519.
31. Cheatwood v. South Central Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 303 F. Supp.
754, 759 (M.D. Ala. 1969). See also Note, An Additional Job Qualification, 7
HOUST. L. REV. 494 (1970); Oldham, Questions of Exclusion and Exception Under
Title Vll-"Sex-Plus" and the BFOQ, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 55 (1971).
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States Supreme Court has stated that the guidelines promulgated by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission are to be given "con-
siderable weight", 2 in practice these guidelines are often ignored. 33
The approach many courts have taken in interpreting Title VII and
the reasonableness of statutory sex classifications have not had the effect
the proponents of legislative change envisioned. The major difficulty
with a legislative approach to the problem of sex discrimination is that
there are many areas which need attention and no one statute can ef-
fectively tackle them all. 4  For example, Title VII does not prevent
sex discrimination in public accommodations35 nor unequal pay scales
in equal or substantially similar jobs.36 Even assuming Congress
could justify federal intrusion into the police powers of the states by
means of the Commerce Clause or section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the burden placed on Congress might well result in piecemeal
legislation which would not effectively solve the problems at which it
is directed." Finally, commentators have argued that because sex dis-
crimination is so deeply and extensively ingrained in our legal system,
federal legislation alone cannot assure its elimination. 8
The inadequacies of the "judicial inclusion" and "piece meal legis-
lative" approaches in removing sex discrimination have provided pow-
erful arguments for the proponents of the Equal Rights Amendment.
The major motivating force behind the campaign to secure ratification
32. Cf. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
33. See Gudbrandson v. Genuine Parts Co., 297 F. Supp. 134 (D. Minn. 1968);
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.Fla. 1970), rev'd,
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971); Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D.
La. 1967). For a case which has been criticized for misinterpreting the bona fide
occupational qualifications, see Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1969), vacated and remanded 400 U.S. 542 (1971); 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 789, 800
(1972).
34. For discussions of the myriad of state prohibitory and protectory laws drawn
on the basis of sex, see 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 789, 796 (1972); Murray & Eastwood,
supra note 9, at 253; Note, supra, note 6, at 1500, 1501. See also Freeman, The
Legal Basis of the Sexual Caste System, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 203 (1971).
35. DeCrow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., 288 F. Supp. 530 (N.D.N.Y. 1968). The
public accommodations section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(1964). See generally Seidenberg, The Submissive Majority: Modern Trends in
the Law Concerning Women's Rights, 55 CORN. L. REV. 262 (1970); Seidenberg, The
Federal Bar v. The Ale House Bar: Women and Public Accommodations, 5 VAL. U.L.
REV. 318 (1971).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) (1963). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964). See
generally Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and Equal Enforcement
of the Law for Women, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 326 (1971).
37. For an overview of legislation still under Congressional consideration, see
Griffiths, supra note 25, at 1; Murray, Economic and Educational Inequality Based
on Sex: An Overview, 5 VAL. U. L. REv. 237 (1971); Fuentes, Federal Remedial
Sanctions: Focus on Title VII, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 374 (1971); Mink, Federal Legislation
to End Discrimination Against Women, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 397 (1971).
38. Griffiths, supra note 25, at 10; Brown, supra note 4, at 872.
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of the proposed Amendment has been the apparent failure of the Su-
preme Court to eliminate sex discrimination through the vehicle of the
fourteenth amendment Equal Protection Clause."9 In addition, the
proponents of a constitutional amendment have advanced other com-
pelling arguments in support of ratification.
Unlike a statute, an amendment would be able to reach deep into
the well of state law and would be a firm expression of a national com-
mitment to eliminate sex discrimination.40 Furthermore, an amend-
ment would at once: provide clear, constitutional authority for protec-
tion from sex discrimination; be highly symbolic; guarantee a hearing
in the courts for everyone who claimed to be oppressed by an actiona-
ble sexual distinction; and have the appearance of permanency. Finally,
the adoption of an amendment would have the immediate advantage of
creating a uniform, coordinated, objective standard against which all
present and future law could be measured, and could potentially guar-
antee the elimination of every vestige of irrational sex discrimination.41
If the Amendment is ratified, it appears certain that there will be
immediate effects upon our legal system. Opponents of the Amend-
ment, perceiving numerous potential dangers with this approach, ar-
gue that the very sweep of the language of the Amendment is its most
serious weakness.42 The dissenting views of the Honorable Emanuel
Cellar, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, are typical
of those voiced in opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment.
I stress we are dealing with a constitutional amendment.
Every word thereof should have exacting scrutiny. It would be
irresponsible to dismiss the language as a mere declaration of
policy without consideration of the possible injurious effects that
could flow therefrom. In all the swirling arguments and differing
interpretations of the language of the proposal, there has been
very little thought given to the triple role most women play in life,
namely, that of wife, mother, and worker. This is a heavy role in-
deed, and to wipe away the sustaining laws which help to tip the
scales in favor of women is to do injustice to millions of women
who have chosen to marry, to make a home, to bear children, and
39. "There never was a time when decisions of the Supreme Court could not have
done everything we ask today .... The Court has held for 98 years that women,
as a class, are not entitled to equal protection of the laws. They are not 'persons' within
the meaning of the Constitution." Hon. Martha W. Griffiths, speaking on H.J. Res.
264, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reported at 116 Cong. Rec. H7953 (daily ed. August
10, 1970). See also USCCAN, at 837.
40. Brown, supra note 4, at 884, 885; Note, supra, note 6, at 1519; USCCAN, at
837.
41. Griffiths, supra note 25, at 11, 14.
42. Note, supra, note 6, at 1519.
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to engage in gainful employment as well. 48
Since a constitutional amendment cannot distinguish between laws
which are to be retained and those which will be found unreasonable,
it lacks the specific remedial nature of a statute, and, therefore, could
result in challenges to socially desirable legislation. The House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, which reported favorably on the Amendment,
felt constrained to caution against a rigid interpretation of Section 1 so
as not to achieve undesirable results, especially with respect to existing
law, such as "protective" legislation designed to accomplish worthy
social goals.44
If specific recognition of sexual equality is needed in the form of a
constitutional amendment, and the Equal Rights Amendment is rati-
fied, how the Court will read the language of the Amendment becomes
important to the fate of legislation measured in light of its provisions.
However, the real question is not how the Court will read the word-
ing of the Amendment, but rather, which judicial yardstick the Court
will use in future sex discrimination cases. It is the nature of the
classification, as perceived by the Court, which is of crucial importance
to the manner in which the statute is read. If the Court reasons that
the Equal Rights Amendment represents a major change in social
policy toward equality of treatment without regard to sex, it may ele-
vate any distinction made on the basis of sex to the status of a "sus-
pect" classification, or, may even view the freedom from discrimination
on the basis of sex as a "fundamental" civil right.4 5  The question
then is what test the Court will use when it considers the proposed
Amendment for the first time.
The Court has, after some initial hesitation,46 consistently upheld
statutory classifications based on sex where the distinction was reasona-
bly related to the purpose of the legislation involved.4 7 The continued
adherence to the principle that sex is a valid basis for classification, ap-
parently reaffirmed in Reed, reveals that the Court is not prepared to
re-examine that premise. Therefore, past decisions of the Supreme
Court indicate no tendency to look beyond traditional assumptions
and tests for validity of classifications based on sex.
43. USCCAN, at 845, 846.
44. USCCAN, at 837, 838. See also Kanowitz, supra note 8, at 181.
45. For the view that the Equal Rights Amendment can only be read in "absolute"
terms, see Brown, supra, note 4, at 892, 893.
46. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
47. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); and cases cited in note 23 supra.
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There is no doubt that the elevation of distinctions based on sex to
the status of a "suspect" classification would be a significant step in
the direction of the removal of sexual inequality. A statute which
made a sex distinction would bear a strong presumption of unconstitu-
tionality. The similarities between race and sex discrimination are
striking, because sex, like race, is highly adaptable to over broad gen-
eralizations based on visible differences. The precedents set by the
Court in the race discrimination area should provide impetus and di-
rection for adoption of the "suspect" classification interpretation.48
Although the Court has given no indication that it intends to adopt
the "suspect" classification test, lower courts have accepted this inter-
pretation and their reasoning may be evidence of the manner in which
the Equal Rights Amendment will be interpreted.49
If the Court accepts the argument that the freedom from all distinc-
tions drawn on the basis of sex is in the nature of a "fundamental"
right, then the removal of all such classifications would be virtually guar-
anteed. Like procreation, marriage and voting, 0 sexual equality would
thereby attain the status of a basic right the Court believes is contained
within the penumbra of guarantees already enumerated in the Bill of
Rights." 1
However, recent treatment of the "fundamental" right approach
casts doubt upon its possible adoption by the Court as the standard
of review in cases of sex discrimination. In Dandridge v. Williams,52
in which welfare recipients sued to enjoin the application of Mary-
48. Classifications have been held "suspect" in: Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68(1968) (illegitimacy); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(wealth); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633 (1948) (nationality); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(national ancestry); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (alienage). See also
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (wealth); Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (race). For the view that sex classifications should be at least nom-
inally suspect, see Note, Are Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, supra,
note 8, at 496.
49. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971);
United States, ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D.Conn. 1968). See also
23 HASTINGs L.J. 311 (1971). But see Buchas v. Illinois High School Assn., 41
U.S.L.W. 2277 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1972).
50. "Basic" civil rights have been found in: Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) (divorce); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (privacy); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (voting); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (religious practice); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960) (association): Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (criminal appeal);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922) (education); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)
(employment). See also Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(voting); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941 ) (interstate travel).
51. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
52. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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land's maximum grant regulation on the ground that the limitation
contravened the Social Security Act of 1935 and the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court specifically excluded
"state regulation in the social and economic field, not affecting free-
doms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights," 3 from active review under
the "fundamental interest" approach. As an example of such social
and economic regulation the Court cited Goesaert v. Cleary,54 in which
it had upheld a Michigan statute prohibiting the licensing of female
bartenders unless they were the wives or daughters of the male owners.
Therefore, despite the fact that the "fundamental" right interpretation
has been urged by litigants and commentators,55 the Court has given
no indication of its readiness to accept this approach.
Whether based on historical inertia or the practical considerations
of the monumental task of re-examination of existing law, the Court
has continually declined to deviate from the "reasonableness" test in
the review of sex distinctions.58 The test that the Court will apply
in interpreting legislation under the Equal Rights Amendment then
will continue to involve a determination of whether or not the sex
distinction made is reasonable with respect to the goals of the statute.
In spite of the absolute language of the Amendment, as long as sex clas-
sifications can be justified as distinctions grounded on "status" or
"function", they will pass constitutional scrutiny.5 7  For example, leg-
islation which regulates medical treatment of expectant mothers would
continue to be viewed as reasonable since women are the only sex
which can attain the status of pregnancy and which has the function of
bearing children. The Equal Rights Amendment, therefore, will only
serve the function of forcing the Court to re-examine what is "reasona-
ble" in light of evolving social trends, and will thereby alter the stand-
ards of what is reasonable under the traditional "reasonableness" test.
The probability that this analytical approach to the constitutionality
of laws which classify or distinguish on the basis of sex will be used by
53. Id. at 484.
54. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
55. See Brown, supra note 4, at 909; Note, Are Sex-Based Classifications Constitu-
tionally Suspect?, supra note 8, at 495.
56. For an analysis of the reasons behind the Court's lack of initiative, see Kanowitz,
supra note 8, at 136; Note, supra note 6, at 1505. See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
57. "Of course, the presence of the Amendment in the Constitution would not be
entirely without special effects. In order to achieve the results suggested . . . . thejudiciary would have to overcome the specific language of the Amendment. But the
point that must be stressed is not only that this would not be impossible of achieve-
ment, but that judges could in fact do this very easily, adopting the analytical approach(functional analysis) mentioned earlier." Kanowitz, supra note 8, at 182.
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the Court reveals that each area in which sex discrimination exists will
need to be examined separately. Without purporting to be an exhaus-
tive compendium of all sex distinctions, the following section of the
article examines some of the areas which are expected to be affected
by the re-evaluation of sexual equality in light of the anticipated
"reasonableness" standard.
A. EMPLOYMENT DISCRiMINATION
1. Job Opportunities
One of the more important areas in which sex discrimination has
persisted is in equal opportunity for employment. Most employment
discrimination on the basis of sex has been directed against women
and based upon the traditional role women are expected to play in so-
ciety.5
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the fe-
male sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded
in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood.
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator. 59
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was enacted primarily to pro-
vide equal access to the job market for both men and women and to
remove the judicially sanctioned practice through which employers es-
tablish policies excluding members of one sex from employment solely
upon the basis of sex. Since 1964, guidelines enacted by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission prohibit private employers from
denying access to jobs on the basis of sexual stereotypes or on general
comparisons made without empirical evidence and require that sex
must actually be a bona fide occupational qualification for the particu-
lar occupation involved.
58. See generally Eastwood, The Double Standard of Justice: Women's Rights
Under the Constitution, 5 VAL. U.L. REv. 281 (1971).
59. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139, 140 (1872) [Bradley, J.,
concurring]. The court in Bradwell held that the right to practice law in the courts of
a state was not one of the privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the
United States. See also In Re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894); Minor v. Happersett, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
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Cases brought by individuals claiming employment discrimination
in violation of Title VII have forced the courts to re-examine tradi-
tional assumptions regarding the employment of women. An example
of this re-assessment is Cheatwood v. South Central Bell Telephone
and Telegraph Co.,60 where the employer had refused to consider a
woman for the position of commercial representative on the ground
that the job required performance of duties which the employer con-
sidered a woman unable to perform and attempted to justify the cate-
gorical refusal to hire women as within the bona fide occupational
qualification exception to Title VII. In a carefully developed and
well-articulated opinion, the court held that the fact that the job
might, due to its requirements, be unromantic, did not mean that it
was functionally related to sex, and hence could not reasonably fall
within the bona fide occupational qualification exception. The em-
ployer could not justify such an arbitrary exclusion on the basis of
physical abilities because the difficult features of the position meant
nothing more than that some women, and some men, might not wish
to perform such tasks.
As Cheatwood explicitly rejected physical differences between the
sexes as the sole basis for a blanket prophylactic rule regarding em-
ployment of one sex, Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.61 re-
jected psychological differences between the sexes as the sole basis for
exclusion from employment. In Diaz, a male had been denied the
position of flight cabin attendant on the basis that female employees
could better provide the personal and psychological comfort to passen-
gers in the closed environment of an airplane cabin. The court held
that the psychological role allegedly played by a female could not be
used as a justification for such a categorical exclusion since the em-
ployer did not demonstrate that sex was an absolute occupational
necessity. Moreover, the mere fact that passengers may have pre-
ferred female employees was irrelevant, because the test for a bona fide
occupational qualification is necessity, not business convenience. 62
Cheatwood and Diaz stand for the principle that categorical denials of
the opportunity to earn a living without regard to individual capaci-
ties, needs and talents are in violation of the prohibition against sex dis-
crimination contained in Title VII.
60. 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
61. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 950 (1971). See also
Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1972).
62. Cf. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969), reh. den.
416 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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Despite the success men and women have had in establishing
equal access to the job market in general, some areas of sex discrimina-
tion remain unaffected.63 In the area of equal access to professional
sports, the courts have been totally unresponsive to claims by women
that statutes prohibiting women from public exhibitions of boxing and
wrestling are violative of the Equal Protection Clause.6 4  Although
justified on the basis of public health, safety and morals, these statu-
tory interpretations are clearly rooted in traditional assumptions re-
garding the role of women in a male-oriented society.
Similarly, the courts have continually denied women access to jobs
in taverns and all-night restaurants. 65  Viewed as being within the
police power of the state, local "bar-maid" ordinances have been up-
held as protective of the public comfort, health, safety, morals and
welfare. 66
Some recent cases have questioned whether these protective laws
conflict with Title VII. 7 For example, the California Supreme Court
held in Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby,68 that a California statute providing
criminal penalties for employment of women in taverns was violative
of the California Constitution, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
and the fourteenth amendment Equal Protection Clause. Despite the
attempt of the court to circumvent apparent conflict with Goesaert v.
Cleary,6 9 its holding clearly draws the underlying rationale of that de-
cision into question. 70
63. See Eslinger v. Thomas, 324 F. Supp. 1329 (D.S.C. 1971), 340 F. Supp. 886(D.S.C. 1972); Local 246, Utility Workers of America v. Southern California Edison
Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of America, 327 F.
Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1972). See also 33 U. PirrT. L. REv. 297 (1971).
64. Calzadilla v. Dooley, 29 App. Div. 2d 152, 286 N.Y.S. 2d 510 (Sup. Ct. 1968);
Oregon v. Hunter, 208 Ore. 282, 300 P.2d 455 (1956). See also Hesseltine v. State
Athletic Commission, 6 Ill.2d 129, 126 N.E.2d 631 (1955).
65. Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924); Krauss v. Sacramento Inn, 314
F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
66. Henson v. Chicago, 415 Ill. 564, 114 N.E.2d 778 (1953). See also Goesaert
v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, the Court stated:
The Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect sociological
insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep
abreast of the latest scientific standards.
See text accompanying note 54 supra.
67. McCrimmon v. Daley, 418 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1969), where the court ad-
mitted the presence of the question. On remand the court found the ordinance void on
its face as a denial of property rights without due process of law. McCrimmon v.
Daley, 2 F.E.P. Cases 971 (N.D. I11. 1970).
68. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971). See also Paterson
Tavern and Grill Owner Association, Inc. v. Borough of Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180,
270 A.2d 628 (1970).
69. 335 U.S. 464 (1948). See text accompanying note 54 supra.
70. "[The statute] . . . .appears to be based upon notions of what is a 'ladylike'
or proper pursuit for a woman in our society rather than any ascertainable evil
effects of permitting women to labor behind those 'permanently affixed fixtures'
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Sail'er Inn is prophetic of the treatment which categorical classifica-
tions will receive after ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment.
Ratification will be an indelible sign to the Court that the American
people believe that the law must reflect a new image of women. The
Amendment will compel the Court to give full and equal effect to the
proposition that the right to work is one of the basic civil liberties en-
joyed by all persons, regardless of their sex, 71 and exhibit that the
Court must interpret the reasonableness of a sex classification without
consideration of sex roles or stereotypes.
2. Promotion and Seniority
After considering the general re-assessment of the role of women in
employment and the success enjoyed by male and female litigants in
challenging discriminatory hiring practices, it is not surprising that
discrimination in the directly related areas of promotion practices and
seniority benefits has been held to be violative of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Co.,7 2 a female employee was refused a promotion to the
position of switchman because the position required the lifting of thirty
pounds of equipment at regular intervals as well as other strenuous
activities. The employer argued that because of the obvious physical
differences between men and women, a woman would be unable to
perform these required tasks. The court held this sex distinction to be
precisely the type of stereotyped classification which Title VII was en-
acted to correct and, therefore, the employer would have to consider
individual qualifications and capabilities in promotion practices.
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.73 involved a similar challenge by
female employees. After finding that the general exclusion of women
from certain positions within the promotional structure of the employer
was violative of Title VII, the court announced the various factors an
known as bars. Such notions cannot justify discrimination against women in employ-
ment." Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 542, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1971).
"The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed
as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not
preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes .... ".Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948). See note 66 supra.
71. "It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the
common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom
and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure."
Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). See also Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347
U.S. 442, 472 (1954) [Douglas, J., dissenting].
72. 277 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967).
73. 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
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employer must use when considering a person for promotion: indi-
vidual qualifications and conditions, physical capability, and physio-
logical make-up; the climactic conditions; and the manner in which
any weights are to be lifted. Arbitrary denial of the opportunity for
advancement without consideration of these factors then is a direct
violation of Title VII.
Practices which limit participation in seniority programs, in whole
or part, are also susceptible to attack as violative of Title VII. In
Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co.74 a female employee was discharged
by her employer as part of an economy measure and because of her
lack of seniority, she could not shift to another position. Under the
company seniority plan only male employees were entitled to partici-
pate and accrue seniority. The court held that the clear effect of this
policy, as applied, constituted a grossly unfair instance of sex discrim-
ination.
Lower courts have established the principle that promotion is to be
based upon individual merit and the assessment of individual capabili-
ties rather than stereotyped characterizations related to sex.7 Promo-
tional and seniority plans must provide equal access to jobs for mem-
bers of either sex. Rather than forging any new paths, the Equal
Rights Amendment will solidify these principles and provide them
with Constitutional authority.
3. Wages
Despite apparent laxity in other areas, 76 the legislative and executive
branches of the federal government have taken significant action to en-
sure equal pay for equal work. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 77 which
74. 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971), reh. den. 450 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1971). See
also Bremer v. St. Louis Southwestern Railroad Co., 310 F. Supp. 1333 (E. D. Mo.
1969); Austin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F. Supp. 1145 (E.D. Va. 1970).
75. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968),
aff'd, 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971), af 'd, 4 F.E.P. Cases 818 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. den. 41 U.S.L.W. 3248 (1972); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills,
300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969); Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 321 F. Supp.
830 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 452 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1971); Gillin v. Federal Paper
Board Co., 52 F.R.D. 383 (D. Conn. 1970); Burns v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994
(S.D. Cal. 1972).
76. See Landau and Dunahoo, Women's Legal Employment Rights and Their
Application in the Arbitral Process, 23 HASTINGs L.J. 95 (1971); Boyer, Help-Wanted
Advertising-Everywoman's Barrier, 23 HASTNGs L.J. 221 (1971); Stanley, Federal
Communications Law and Women's Rights: Women in the Wasteland Fight Back,
23 HASTINGs L.J. 15 (1971); Note, Sex and the Single Man: Discrimination in the
Dependent Care Deduction, 5 VAL. U. L. REv. 415 (1971).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963).
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was specifically enacted to require that male and female employees re-
ceive equal compensation for equal work, has served as the basis for
numerous suits by the Secretary of Labor to compel compliance with
its provisions. For example, in Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.,78 the
Secretary brought suit against an employer for injunctive relief and
back pay, alleging overt pay discrimination against female employees.
The employer, who had been paying female employees ten per cent
less than male employees, attempted to justify the disparity by arguing
that men had additional responsibilities and were hired on a com-
pletely different basis than women. The court held that although the
work performed by men and women at the employer's plant was not
exactly the same, it was virtually identical, and, therefore, the disparity
in pay was violative of the Act.
In Shultz v. First Victoria National Bank79 the employer attempted
to justify its wage discrimination against women on the ground that
male employees were engaged in an extensive training program which
involved job rotation designed to provide experience at various posi-
tions within the employment hierarchy. Looking through form to
substance, the court found that the "training program" was a sham,
created as a post-event justification for a disparate pay scale, and held
the pay scale in violation of the Act.
Therefore, disparities in pay based upon alleged differences in on
the job performance cannot stand under the Act where the work actu-
ally performed is substantially similar in nature or requires equal skill,
effort and responsibility, or where the extra work performed is de-
signed solely to circumvent the provisions of the Act. 0  But, even
though litigants have been successful in challenging discriminatory pay
practices as unreasonable under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, courts
have not been convinced that discrimination between the sexes in the es-
tablishment of minimum wage scales is violative of the Act or the
fourteenth amendment Equal Protection Clause.
The justifications for this discriminatory treatment in favor of wo-
men appear in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish."1 In a five-four de-
78. 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), reported below sub nom. Wirtz v. Wheaton Glass
Co., 284 F. Supp. 23 (D.N.J. 1968).
79. 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969).
80. See Hodgson v. Daisy Manufacturing Co., 445 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1971);
Krumbeck v. John Oster Manufacturing Co., 313 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Wis. 1970);
Shultz v. Saxonburg Ceramics, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Hodgson v.
Brookhaven General Hospital, 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970); Hodgson v. Square D. Co.,
459 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. den. 41 U.S.L.W. 3223 (1972). But see Manning
v. Auto Workers, 41 U.S.L.W. 2181 (6th Cir. 1972).
81. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). cf. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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cision, the Court upheld a Washington statute which provided mini-
mum wage scales only for women on the ground that it was within
the power of a state to pass protective legislation to insure the health,
safety, morals and welfare of some (though apparently not all) of its
citizens. The language of the opinion clearly delineates the Court's
view regarding the position of the sexes in employment. Quoting at
length from its decision in Muller v. Oregon,82 the Court reasoned that
. . . woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsist-
ence and. . . her physical well-being becomes an object of public
interest and care in order to nreserve the health and vigor of the
race.
Hence she was properly placed in a class by herself, and leg-
islation designed for her protection may be sustained even when
like legislation is not necessary for men and could not be sus-
tained.8 3
Apparently believing that the rationale of West Coast was still valid
despite considerable change in social views, the court in Bastardo v.
Warren"4 recently refused to overturn a Wisconsin minimum-wage
law which applied only to women and minors. The court disagreed
with the argument that the right to a minimum wage was a "funda-
mental interest" and that any classification based on sex was inherently
"suspect". Instead, it found that the burden would rest on the male
plaintiffs to demonstrate that the non-inclusion of men in the statute
was an unreasonable classification under the traditional equal protec-
tion test, and granted leave to amend for that purpose.
It appears certain that ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment
would require a re-assessment of the reasonableness of such classifica-
tions in order to attain the goal of equal treatment without regard to
sex. Also, it could be argued that, just as there is a necessity for
equal pay for equal work under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, equality
in pay scales demands that all qualified workers, and not only those
perceived by courts and legislatures as being unique and in need of
protection, have the benefit of a statutory minimum designed to guar-
antee a living wage. Interpretation of the Equal Rights Amendment
should require that legislation enacted for protective purposes conform
to the principle of equal treatment without regard to sex.
82. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). See text accompanying note 85 infra.
83. West Coast Hotel Co. v .Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 394 (1937).
84. 332 F. Supp. 501 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
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4. Hours
Most of the constitutional litigation in the area of employment dis-
crimination has focused upon protective legislation regulating the maxi-
mum number of hours a person may work. This protective legislation
was enacted to correct abuse of women in employment. The seminal
decision in this area is Muller v. Oregon,"5 where the Court upheld a
1903 Oregon law which prohibited women from working more than
ten hours per day in mechanical establishments, factories or laundries.
The reasoning of the Court was based entirely upon the alleged physi-
cal dependence of women upon men.
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence
is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of mother-
hood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant testi-
mony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time on her
feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious ef-
fects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigor-
ous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object
of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and
vigor of the race.
Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has always
been dependent upon man. He established his control at the out-
set by superior physical strength .... 81
Apparently mesmerized by precedent, the Court continued to uphold
legislation regulating the hours women could work in employment situ-
ations such as: factories, hotels, telephone or telegraph offices, mil-
lineries, dressmaking shops and restaurants.87
Despite the Supreme Court authority sustaining such legislation,
more recent decisions have begun to re-assess the reasonableness of
hours limitations in light of modem working conditions and the evolv-
ing trend toward sexual equality. In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Gra-
biec, 8 the court held that the Illinois Female Employment Act was
violative of the 1964 Civil Rights Act since the Illinois statute re-
quired employers to discriminate against their employees on the basis
of sex with regard to compensation, terms and conditions of employ-
ment, privileges, and working hours."9 In a similar decision, the
85. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
86. Id. at 421.
87. Hawley v. Walker, 232 U.S. 718 (1914); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671
(1914); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385
(1915).
88. 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ill. 1970).
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 5 (1937).
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court in Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.90 held that the Pennsyl-
vania Women's Labor Law of 1913 was invalid as a per se violation
of Title VII since the Pennsylvania statute regulated the wages of
women employees only, and, therefore, discriminated solely on the
basis of sex.
Current challenges to maximum hours legislation demonstrate that
the underlying rationale of Muller is open to serious question."'
Clearly, if there is a right to work at the occupation of one's choice,92
limitations upon the hours a person may work are a restraint on the
fundamental right of a citizen to control his or her own time.93 Ratifi-
cation of the Equal Rights Amendment will pressure the courts to re-
examine the premises formulated in prior decisions.
Maximum hours legislation was historically considered to be a social
benefit. However, such protective legislation impedes the drive for
equality in employment without regard to sex. Legislation that in-
tentionally confers a "benefit" upon one sex, by limiting the number
of hours a person of that sex may work, should be construed as a
detriment to the other sex, and, therefore, a violation of equal protec-
tion. Faced with the empirical evidence of present working conditions
for male and female employees, and bearing in mind evolving social
trends, the courts should find that this type of protective legisla-
tion is unreasonable. The Amendment would have the dual effect of
clarifying any doubt that the trend of social evolution is toward sexual
equality, and indicating that these protective laws cannot meet the
stringent goal of equal opportunity for employment and advancement
without regard to sex.
5. Marriage and Pregnancy
Employment discrimination on the basis of marital status or stage of
pregnancy has also received close scrutiny by the courts. In Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 4 a stewardess had been dismissed from her
job pursuant to a rule of the employer which required that all steward-
esses must be unmarried. In addition to arguing that the non-marriage
requirement was a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer
90. 325 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
91. See Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971);
Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 323 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1971); Mengelkoch v. In-
dustrial Welfare Commission, 284 F. Supp. 950 (C.D. Cal. 1968), vacated and remanded
393 U.S. 83 (1968), reh. den. 393 U.S. 993 (1968).
92. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
93. Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 108, 109 (1895).
94. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
1973
Loyola University Law Journal
contended that in fact it was not discriminating against all women, but
rather against married women only, a situation not encompassed within
the scope of Title VII. The court held that the non-marriage requirement
bore absolutely no relationship to job competence and could not be
justified as a bona fide occupational qualification. The court coun-
tered the employer's secondary argument with the following reason-
ing:
The scope of Section 703(a)(1) is not confined to explicit
discrimination based "solely" on sex. In forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress in-
tended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes. . . . The effect
of the Statute is not diluted because discrimination adversely af-
fects only a portion of the protected class. Discrimination is not
to be tolerated under the guise of physical properties possessed by
one sex. .... 95
Therefore, discharge of employees solely on the ground of marital
status has been held to constitute a clear and unexplainable discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex.96
Most of the laws regulating the treatment of pregnant women as em-
ployees are the result of legislative judgment regarding the health,
safety and welfare of the mother and her child. The validity of the
traditional assumptions invoked to uphold these laws-the weaker
physical structure of women and the perceived burdens of mother-
hood-is questionable.
Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board97 presented the court
with a challenge to a school board regulation which required that a
teacher who becomes pregnant must take a maternity leave at the end
of the fifth month of pregnancy. The court held that the employer
had demonstrated no medical or psychological reasons for the regula-
tion, and had not sustained the burden of proving that physical safety
or the ability to perform teaching duties was in any manner impaired
by pregnancy. Moreover, the court found that even if it accepted the
proposition that pregnancy was a physical disability within the meaning
of the employer's regulations, the school board had treated this disabil-
ity differently than other medical disabilities without rational justifica-
tion.
95. Id. at 1198. See also 29 C.F.R. 1604.3(a) (1965).
96. See Jurinko v. Edwin L. Weigand Co., 331 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
See also Lansdale v. United Air Lines, Inc., 437 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1971).
97. 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971), a/I'd, 41 U.S.L.W. 2167 (4th Cir. Sept.
14, 1972).
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In a similar case, the employer argued that permitting a pregnant
woman to remain on the job indefinitely would chance delivery in the
classroom, and created the additional problem of engaging substitute
teachers on short notice. The court in Williams v. San Francisco Uni-
fied School District98 held that the school district had presented no
medical proof that a woman could not fulfill her duties up to the time
of delivery or that the hypothetical situation suggested had any sub-
stantial probability of occurrence. Furthermore, the court found that
the school district could, and often did, find substitute teachers on
short notice.
Cohen and Williams9 establish the principle that pregnancy cannot
be used as a surface justification for discrimination on the basis of sex.
Employers must judge the capacity of an individual to fulfill the duties
of employment only upon individual capacities, characteristics and
abilities and not upon broad policies founded in unsubstantiated as-
sumptions.
Notwithstanding the reasoning of Cohen and Williams, the treat-
ment of challenges to employment discrimination based on marital
status or stage of pregnancy has not been uniform. 10 For example,
in Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 0 1 Delta refused to hire a married
woman as a stewardess on the same grounds as those raised by United
Air Lines in Sprogis. Contrary to the reasoning in Sprogis, the court
in Cooper accepted the argument by the employer that discrimination
against married women only was not violative of Title VII, and thus
the employer was not guilty of sex discrimination within the meaning
of the Act. La Fleur v. Cleveland Board of Education"2 found that
a regulation very similar to the rule invalidated in Cohen was a rea-
sonable measure to minimize disruption of classroom programs due to
unforseen complications in the teacher's condition. La Fleur accepted
without question the arguments of the employer regarding the health
and safety of the employees and the difficulty in obtaining substitute
teachers.
98. 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
99. See Bravo v. Board of Education, 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Shattman
v. Texas Employment Commission, 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 459
F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), reh. den. 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972).
100. See Guelich v. Mounds View Independent Public School District, 334 F. Supp.
1276 (D. Minn. 1972); Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association v. American
Air Lines, Inc., 455 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1972); Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 41
U.S.L.W. 3116 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 1971), cert. granted 41 U.S.L.W. 3229 (Oct. 24, 1972).
101. 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967).
102. 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd, 41 U.S.L.W. 2090 (6th Cir.
1972). See also Miller v. Industrial Commission, 480 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1971); Cerra
v. East Stroudsburg Area School District, 3 Pa. Cwlth. 665, 285 A.2d 206 (1971).
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Doe v. Osteopathic Hospital of Wichita, Inc. 0 8 indicates that
Cooper and La Fleur are not in the mainstream of current thought on
employment discrimination. In Doe, a female hospital employee was
dismissed due to the fact that she was both pregnant and unwed. The
court found that neither the plaintiff's marital status nor stage of
pregnancy had any relevance to the performance of her duties as an
employee. Neither ground could be reasonably justified as a bona fide
occupational qualification.
Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment would have the effect
of causing Doe, Cohen and Sprogis to be accepted as the better view.
Freedom from discrimination on the basis of sex surely means that
compulsory maternity leave is an "unreasonable" sex classification
within the language of the Equal Rights Amendment absent a clear
showing that the particular pregnancy involved interferes with the per-
formance of the duties of employment. Similarly, and particularly be-
cause marriage has been viewed as a basic civil right, 04 the language
of the Amendment envisions freedom from discrimination on the basis
of marital status.
6. Retirement and Pension Plans
Perhaps the trend of decisions in promotion and seniority discrimi-
nation has influenced the courts to respond favorably to challenges
made against discriminatory practices in retirement and pension pro-
grams. In Rosen v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 10 5 the male
plaintiffs challenged the company retirement and pension plan on the
ground that it provided for earlier retirement ages and greater pension
benefits for female employees than for male employees. In spite of
the fact that the employer had revised the plan during pendency of the
suit, the court held that both the new and old plans were sexually
discriminatory, caused injury to male employees, and had to be re-
scinded. Absent any factors other than sex, the court could find no
reasonable justification for the beneficial nature of the plan towards
women.
It seems unlikely that Congress would enact a statute banning
discrimination based on sex and in so doing mean to grant special
privileges to one sex at the expense of the other. Title VII rejects
103. 333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan. 1971). Accord Cirino v. Walsh, 66 Misc. 2d 450,
321 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1971). See also Jinks v. Mays, 332 F. Supp. 254 (N.D.
Ga. 1971).
104. Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
105. 328 F. Supp. 454 (D.N.J. 1971).
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the notion of "romantic paternalism" towards women and seeks to
place them on equal footing with men.' 0 6
Bartmess v. Drewrys, U.S.A., Inc.10 7 also involved a challenge to a
sexually discriminatory retirement plan. There, a female employee al-
leged that the company retirement program was sexually discrimina-
tory since it forced her to retire three years earlier than male employ-
ees. The court, relying on the reasoning of Rosen, held that the plan
was violative of both Title VII and Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission guidelines. In the course of its analysis of the retirement
program, the court found that the classification of employees on the
basis of sex was contrary to the intent of Title VII.
Rosen and Bartmess'08 stand for the proposition that an employer
cannot discriminate among employees on the basis of sex in the estab-
lishment of retirement and pension plans because sex is not in any
way functionally related to reception of benefits. Ratification of the
Equal Rights Amendment will have the impact of elevating the hold-
ings of Rosen and Bartmess to the status of constitutionally sanctioned
doctrine. If sex discrimination cannot be justified in the earlier phases
of employment procedures, it cannot stand in the area of retirement
and pension plans.
7. Summation
Courts are presently re-assessing the law in the area of employment
discrimination. Traditional assumptions and sexual stereotypes have
often been rejected as unreasonable in response to the evolving concept
of sexual equality. The result of this judicial activity has been to
broaden employment opportunities, to fix the criteria for employment,
promotion and retirement, and to establish guidelines for the enact-
ment of wage and hours legislation.
However, a clear trend toward freedom from sex discrimination in
employment has not been established. For example, the unwillingness
of the courts to question some protective legislation has left a consider-
able gap in the re-examination of existing law. The reluctance of the
courts to act in these areas appears to be based upon either the general
acceptance of legislative assumptions underlying protective laws or the
impediment created by stare decisis.
106. Id. at 463, 464.
107. 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
108. See Ugiansky v. Flynn and Emrich Co., 337 F. Supp. 807 (D. Md. 1972).
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Since the Amendment will have the effect of forcing a re-evaluation
of the reasonableness of sex classifications, it can be expected that the
present judicial re-assessment of employment discrimination will be
bolstered by its ratification. More important, areas which the courts
have been reluctant to examine will be subject to judicial scrutiny.
The impact of the Equal Rights Amendment will be substantial be-
cause the courts will have the necessary constitutional mandate to ex-
amine every area of employment in which sex classifications exist.
B. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
Employment is not the only area in which men and women have re-
ceived preferential treatment or experienced sex discrimination. There
continue to be other areas in which either men or women are discrim-
inated against solely on the basis of sex.
1. Educational Opportunities
Discrimination on the basis of sex in the attainment of an education
is perhaps the most fundamental and invidious form of an equal pro-
tection violation. Relying in part upon this rationale, four female ap-
plicants to the University of Virginia at Charlottesville brought suit in
Kirstein v. Rector and Vistors of University of Virginia"0 9 to compel
consideration of their applications to the College of Arts and Sciences.
Prior to the suit, the University of Virginia at Charlottesville had been
a substantially all-male institution. The court held that even though
the pattern of separation by sex in education was long established in
America and had substantial historical precedents, the Commonwealth
of Virginia could not deny educational opportunities to women on the
basis of sex. Crucial to -the court's holding was the determination
that the educational opportunities offered by the University of Vir-
gina, including its "prestige" factor, were not available in any of the
other co-educational or sex-separate educational facilities operated by
the state. 110
The plaintiffs in Kirstein urged the court to hold that the state could
not operate any educational institution separated according to the
sexes. The court declined to handle the issue since
109. 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970). See generally Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110. Since the University of Virginia had altered its policy of denying women
admission on the basis of sex during pendency of the suit, the court dismissed the case
as moot with leave to re-instate the cause if the university did not adhere to the plan
to admit women on the same basis as men. With regard to the impact of the "prestige"
factor, see Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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* . . obvious problems beyond our capacity to decide on this
record readily occur. One of Virginia's educational institutions is
military in character. Are women to be admitted on an equal
basis, and, if so, are they to wear uniforms and be taught to bear
arms?"
l
'
The questions left unanswered by Kirstein were specifically pre-
sented in Williams v. McNair."2  In Williams, male applicants sued to
enjoin enforcement of a South Carolina statute which, in effect, made
Winthrop College an all-female institution. The College, a state-sup-
ported educational institution, conceded that the male plaintiffs met all
other admission requirements. The court found that discrimination
on the basis of sex was an integral part of the state scheme of educa-
tion and that all but two state-supported schools were co-educational:
the Citadel was a military school for men and Winthrop College was a
liberal arts school for young ladies. Also, the court found that there
was no "prestige" factor present as there was in Kirstein, and that
Winthrop College gave special attention to courses especially helpful
to female students. The court held, therefore, that the maintenance
of sex-separate educational facilities was not violative of equal protec-
tion.
Central to the court's holding was the finding that Winthrop College
was only one small part of an overall system of state-supported higher
education and that plaintiffs were free to choose from a broad range
of alternatives.
While history and tradition alone may not support a discrimination,
the Constitution does not require that a classification "keep abreast
of the latest" in educational opinion, especially when there remains
a respectable opinion to the contrary; it only demands that the dis-
crimination not be wholly wanting in reason.
After all, flexibility and diversity in educational methods,
when not tainted with racial overtones, often are both desirable
and beneficial; they should be encouraged, not condemned." 3
The impact of the Equal Rights Amendment on this area of sex-
classification is difficult to predict. As the court in Williams noted,
there is a considerable body of educational opinion holding that sex-
separate education is both beneficial and desirable. It may well be
that even after ratification of the Amendment, sex-separate educational
111. Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184, 187
(E.D. Va. 1970).
112. 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), afrd. mem., 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
113. Id. at 137, 138. See also Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958), cert. den. 359 U.S. 230 (1959); Allred v. Heaton, 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960), cert. den. 364 U.S. 517 (1960).
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facilities could continue to be found reasonable. Essential to this ra-
tionale, however, will be that: the sex-separate school orients its cur-
riculum toward training the members of one sex only; the school is
one part of an overall scheme of both co-educational and sex-separate
educational institutions; and no prestige factor is involved. As long
as alternative educational facilities are provided which are of the same
general quality as the sex-separate school, individual plaintiffs may not
be able to demonstrate actual harm by the denial of admission to the
sex-separate school solely on the basis of sex.
On the other hand, future litigants may be successful in convincing
the courts that sex-separate educational facilities rely for justification
upon traditional assumptions regarding sex-roles. For example, mili-
tary schools have traditionally been limited to males, either because it
is assumed women do not desire to participate in a military-oriented
curriculum, or that society cannot tolerate the training of women for
military duty. The validity of such judgments is open to serious ques-
tion in light of the evolving social trend toward sexual equality.
Clearly, if the effect of sex-separate education is to foster and maintain
sexual stereotypes and unsubstantiated assumptions regarding sex-
roles, it is violative of both the letter and spirit of the Equal Rights
Amendment. The Amendment may have the effect of causing a seri-
ous reconsideration of the reasonableness of the entire scheme of sex-
separate education.
2. Personal Appearance
Related to sex discrimination in the attainment of an education is
discrimination based on personal appearance, because denial of the op-
portunity to attend school on appearance factors forcloses the ability
to attain an education. In Crews v. Cloncs,"' a male high school
student was refused re-admission to school on the ground that the
length of his hair was in violation of unpublished regulations govern-
ing personal appearance. As justification for these regulations, the
school cited health and safety considerations, physical danger during
sports activities and science labs, and the element of disruption among
the student body caused by the presence of long-haired males. The
court found that the school had demonstrated no health problems or
physical dangers to any person, nor that any disturbance or disruption
114. 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970).
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among students had actually occurred. Relying on prior decisions," 5
the court held that there was a fundamental right to individual per-
sonal appearance and that the school had unnecessarily infringed on
that right with its regulations.
Ruling upon the plaintiffs allegation that the denial of re-admission
also constituted discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of the
fourteenth amendment, the court in Crews reasoned:
. . . both witnesses admitted in their testimony that although girls
engage in substantially the same activities in gym and biology
classes, only boys have been required to cut their hair in order to
attend classes. Although classification on the basis of sex has been
held constitutional in certain circumstances, [citations omitted] de-
fendants have offered no reasons why health and safety objectives
are not equally applicable to high school girls. On the present
record therefore, we believe that defendant's action constitutes a
denial of equal protection to male students.""
Despite the cogent reasoning of Crews,"7 the majority of courts
which have been presented with the appearance issue have held in
favor of the school regulations."' These courts have either refused
to recognize a fundamental right to control personal appearance, or de-
clined to interfere in the local administration of state schools.
Where the issue of sex discrimination has been raised by litigants, 19
these courts have afforded it only cursory treatment. For example,
in King v. Saddleback Junior College District,'" male plaintiffs sued
to enjoin the enforcement of a provision of the school dress code pro-
viding for limitations on the length of hair worn by male students.
Holding that the regulations did not violate due process or equal pro-
115. See Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), where the court held that
control of individual personal appearance was a fundamental right.
116. Crews, supra, 432 F.2d 1259, 1266 (7th Cir. 1970).
117. See Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (lst Cir. 1970); Griffin v. Tatum,
425 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1970); Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 41 U.S.L.W. 2195 (5th
Cir. 1972).
118. See Stevenson v. Board of Education, 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. den.
400 U.S. 957 (1970); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 400
U.S. 850 (1970); Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1971); Ferrell v. Dallas
Independent School District, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968); Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d
609 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. den. 41 U.S.L.W. 3249 (1972); Rider v. Pawnee City Board
of Education, 41 U.S.L.W. 2107 (N.D. Okl. 1972).
119. Most litigants in personal appearance cases have relied upon the fundamental
right approach, basing their arguments on the cases of Tinker v. Des Moines Indepen-
dent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). The difficulties with this reliance is demonstrated by the case of
Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), where the court was unable to find
that such a fundamental right existed in the Constitution.
120. 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971).
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tection, the court answered the allegation of sex discrimination with
the following language:
There was no evidence of racial discrimination or that the
regulation in either case was applied in other than an even handed
manner, nor was there any evidence of unequal protection other
than the assertion that boys were treated differently than girls;
i.e., girls could have long hair and boys could not. We do not
consider the latter difference in treatment or classification as cre-
ating any substantial constitutional question.' 2'
The reasoning of King contravenes the specific intent of the Equal
Rights Amendment. The Amendment would provide a strong basis
for challenges to appearance regulations from the standpoint of sex
discrimination because the focus of the attack on these regulations
would shift from the "fundamental right" argument to a sex discrim-
ination argument. Under this view, regulations which require that
one sex dress or appear in a particular manner would be unreasonable
sex discrimination because regulations based upon sexual stereotypes
and traditional assumptions regarding appearance bear no relationship
to functions or abilities.
3. Summation
Many instances of preferential treatment of one sex exist in society.
Litigants have raised challenges to such diverse preferential practices
as: determining domicile on the basis of the residence of the husband;' 122
according women more favorable treatment in, the computation
of social security benefits;123 excluding fathers of illegitimate children
from the status of parent; 2 1 requiring that males be twenty-one years
of age for marriage without parental consent but permitting females to
marry at age eighteen; 2 and preferring males over females in the
administration of estates.' 26
The outcome of these challenges has varied with the success liti-
gants have had in convincing the courts that the particular practice
121. Id. at 939.
122. Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
123. Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. den. sub. nom.,
Gruenwald v. Cohen, 393 U.S. 982 (1968). See Walker, Sex Discrimination in Govern-
ment Benefit Programs, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 277 (1971). See also Frontiero v. Laird, 327
F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Ala. 1971), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3165 (1972), where the
plaintiff challenged the Armed Forces Medical Service Plan as discriminatory against
men.
124. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
125. OPIoN OF THE ATrOrNEY GENERAL OF TFE STATE Op ILLINOIS, File #S-490,
June 30, 1972.
126. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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challenged constituted an unreasonable discrimination on the basis of
sex. For example, in the area of public accommodations, two mem-
bers of the National Organization for Women brought suit in Seiden-
berg v. McSorelys' Old Ale House, Inc.a2 7 to enjoin continuance of the
defendant tavern owner's one hundred and fourteen-year-old policy of
serving only men, claiming the practice violated both the Civil Rights
Act of 1871128 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court held that
there was no rational basis for serving men in public accommodations
and not women because sex bore no relationship to the status of being
a customer. Seidenberg is an example of socially conscious reasoning
with respect to sex discrimination because the court indicated that its
decision was based in part upon the recognition of the evolving trend
toward sexual equality.
Criminal statutes which provide more serious penalties for women
than for men have also been successfully challenged. For example, in
United States ex rel. Robinson v. York," 9 a woman serving a criminal
sentence petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that
the Connecticut statute under which she had been sentenced contra-
vened equal protection because it permitted adult women to be im-
prisoned for periods in excess of the maximums applicable to men
guilty of the same substantive crimes. The court found that the free-
dom from discrimination on the basis of sex was encompassed within
the fourteenth amendment, accepted the argument that statutes drawn
on the basis of sex should be viewed as suspect, and held that since
there was no rational relationship between sex and the commission of
crimes and no rational justification for longer incarceration of women
as opposed to men, the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. 130
All of the areas in which preferential treatment has occurred and
continues to occur are premised upon the traditional roles each sex is
expected to play in society. Eradication of such forms of preferential
treatment will require a substantial alteration in the assumptions un-
derlying these sex roles.
The nature of the reasonableness test employed in Seidenberg to
invalidate the preferential treatment accorded males in public accom-
127. 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). For the court's opinion on defendant's
motion to dismiss, see 308 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Accord Bennett v. Dyer's
Chop House, 41 U.S.L.W. 2243 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 1972).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).
129. 281 F. Supp. 8 (D.Conn. 1968).
130. For an apparently contrary view, see Wark v. Robbins, 458 F.2d 1295 (1st Cir.
1972).
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modations represents the approach anticipated under the proposed
Amendment. York accepted the labeling of any statute drawn on the
basis of sex as suspect, thereby going beyond the reasonableness test
anticipated under the Equal Rights Amendment. Even if the rationale
of York is not accepted by other courts after ratification of the Amend-
ment, the broad scope of that decision, coupled with the reasoning of
Seidenberg, will at least have the function of providing a standard against
which these preferential practices are to be measured.
C. RIGHTS AND DuTIEs
1. Right to sue for Loss of Consortium
Sex discrimination appears in almost every facet of life, and is es-
pecially prevalent in the rights and duties incident to citizenship. For
example, the majority of states have permitted suits for loss of con-
sortium only by the husband. 1 ' Various rationales have been used to
justify this discrimination: the need to prevent double recoveries; the
remote and indirect nature of the wife's injuries; the unavailability of
the remedy at common law; the fact that the wife has no right to her
husband's services; and deference to legislative discretion.
There is no question that the denial to the wife of the right to sue for
loss of consortium is rooted in the common law concept of marriage.
The common-law rule . . . denying the wife an action for
loss of consortium due to the negligent injury of her husband was
promulgated at a period in history when all the wife's personal
property, money and chattels of every description became her hus-
band's upon marriage. She could neither contract, nor bring any
action of any kind. Husband and wife were one, and "he was
that one". . . . Since the husband was entitled to his wife's ser-
vices in the home, as he was to those of any servant in his employ,
if he lost those services through the acts of another, that person
had to respond in damages. . . . He had a right of action for
injury to her grounded on the theory that she was his servant.
However, should the husband be injured, the wife, being a legal
nonentity . . . could bring no action. A servant could hardly sue
for the loss of services of the master.132
131. See O'Neil v. United States, 92 U.S. App. D.C. 96, 202 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir.
1953) (Maryland law); Werthan Bag Corp. v. Agnew, 202 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1953)
(Arkansas law); Seymour v. Union News Co., 217 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1954) (Illinois
law); Sestito v. Knop, 297 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1961) (Wisconsin law); Carey v. Foster,
345 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1965) (Virginia law); Criqui v. Blaw-Knox Corp., 318 F.2d 811
(10th Cir. 1963) (Kansas law).
132. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 11.2d 406, 422 (1960). See text accompanying note 136
inf ra.
Vol. 4: 69
Equal Rights Amendment
Notwithstanding the obvious changes in the social, economic and
legal status of married women during the ensuing centuries, common
law rules allowing the husband a cause of action for loss of consortium
but denying the wife a reciprocal action were uniformly adhered to by
the courts until 1950.133 In Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc.,'134 the wife
of an injured employee brought suit under the Longshoreman and
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act for loss of consortium claiming
that the injuries to her husband's body deprived her of his aid, as-
sistance, enjoyment and sexual relations. Despite the unanimity of au-
thority denying recovery in such circumstances, the court found itself
unable to find any substantial rationale on which to predicate denial of
recovery.
There can be no doubt that the expressed view of this court is
that the husband and the wife have equal rights in the marriage
relation which will receive equal protection of the law. . . . It is
not for us, at this late date under the modern concepts of the mar-
riage relations, to deny the wife legal protection of this right.
135
Accordingly, the court held that the wife had a cause of action for loss
of consortium due to negligent injury to her husband.
Although Hitaffer raised the equal protection issue with regard to
rights emanating from the marriage relation, most courts which have
rejected the common law disability of wives to sue for loss of con-
sortium have done so on the ground that such denial misperceives the
nature of the remedy. For example, in Dini v. Naiditch,136 the Illinois
Supreme Court considered and rejected each of the justifications of-
fered by the state for denying wives the right to sue for loss of con-
sortium. After an exhaustive review of the underlying assumptions
and common law history of these justifications, the Dini court held
that cogent reasoning must outweigh numerical authority and the
wife's suit for loss of consortium must be recognized by the law.
Even where the equal protection argument has been used to invali-
date the denial of the right of the wife to sue, the treatment of this is-
sue has been cursory at best. Owen v. Illinois Banking Corp.,131
where a wife sued to recover damages for loss of consortium, cited
133. Id. at 423. A list of cases adhering to the common law rule is provided in
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc., 87 U.S. App. D.C. 57, 183 F.2d 811, 812, n. 5 (D.C.
Cir. 1950).
134. 87 U.S. App. D.C. 57, 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. den. 340 U.S. 852
(1950).
135. Id. 183 F.2d 811, at 816. But see Smither and Co. v. Coles, 100 U.S. App.
D.C. 68, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
136. 20 Ill.2d 406 (1960). Accord Manders v. Pulice, 44 Ill.2d 511 (1970).
137. 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
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Hitaffer with approval and concluded that the denial of the right to
sue for loss of consortium, when applied to a wife but not a husband,
was a clear violation of equal protection.
Hitaffer and Owen did not actually analyze the equal protection
problem but rather stated a conclusion, and hence the cases are of
limited precedential value. Indeed, subsequent decisions have noted
that the conclusions reached in Hitaffer and Owen were unsupported
by any substantive reasoning 3 s and have suggested that the decisions
did not actually rest on equal protection grounds.'3 9
Irrespective of their faults Hitaffer and Owen raised a substantial is-
sue which had to be considered by later courts. For example, Igneri
v. CIE de Transports Oceaniques,4 ° a case involving a wife's suit for
loss of consortium under federal maritime law, attempted to avoid the
equal protection issue,14 ' and in Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp.42
the conclusion of the majority that the classification attacked was per-
missible sparked a critical dissent which rested entirely upon the equal
protection argument.' 43
Decisions which recognize loss of consortium actions by wives
would be the trend under the proposed Amendment. The decision
which most closely represents the view the courts are expected to
adopt after ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment is Karczewski
v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.'44  Karczewski thoroughly ana-
lyzed the equal protection problem and, citing such authorities as
Prosser, Hittaffer and Dini, the court held that the denial of the wife's
right to sue for loss of consortium was a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.145
A classification based on sex is not justified where it restricts rights
in a manner which has no bearing on either function or physical char-
acteristics. Clearly, the denial of the right to sue for loss of consortium
discriminates unreasonably against women because the right to sue
138. Karczewski v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 274 F. Supp. 169, 175 (N.D.
Ill. 1967). See text accompanying note 144 infra.
139. Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847, 850, 851, (7th Cir. 1968).
See text accompanying note 142 infra.
140. 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963).
141. "Our conclusion, it should be emphasized, does not rest on the discrimination
between the sexes criticized by Hitaffer and its supporters .... ." Id. at 268. See also
Lunow v. Fairchance Lumber Co., 389 F.2d 212 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. den. 392 U.S.
908 (1968).
142. 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. den. 393 U.S. 1066 (1969) (Indiana law).
143. Id. at 851 [Schnackenberg, J., dissenting].
144. 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Il. 1967).
145. Id. at 175.
100
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bears no relationship to functional abilities or physical characteristics.
Although some courts have found this type of sex discrimination to
violate equal protection, ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment
would provide the impetus for acceleration of the invalidation of this
discrimination and guarantee that where the right to sue for loss of
consortium is granted, it is granted on an equal basis to both partners
to a marriage.
2. Jury Duty
One of the primary duties incident to citizenship is the duty to serve
on grand and petit juries. However, for nearly a half-century after
adoption of the fourteenth amendment the practice which permitted
only men to sit on these juries continued. Although many states al-
tered this practice by statute, women were usually granted limited ex-
emptions or blanket exclusions from service because of their sex.
In 1947, the petitioner in Fay v. New York 46 challenged the New
York jury selection procedure on the ground that it unconstitutionally
permitted women a blanket exemption from service on special or
"blueribbon" juries. The Court held that there had been no depriva-
tion of due process.
The contention that women should be on the jury is not based
on the Constitution, it is based on a changing view of the rights and
responsibilities of women in our public life, which has progressed in
all phases of life, including jury duty, but has achieved constitu-
tional compulsion on the states only in the grant of the franchise by
the Nineteenth Amendment. 14T
Fifteen years later, the Court was faced with a similar challenge in
Hoyt v. Florida.4 " A woman, convicted of murder by an all-male
jury, appealed claiming that the Florida jury service statute which
provided for an absolute exemption for women from service absent a
voluntary waiver, violated the fourteenth amendment. Holding that
the Florida statute was neither unconstitutional on its face nor as ap-
plied, the Court rested its decision on the reasonableness of the classi-
fication, since woman is still regarded as the center of home and family
life,' 49 and concluded that it was constitutionally permissible for a
state to relieve women from the civic duty of jury service.
146. 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
147. Id. at 290.
148. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
149. Id. at 62.
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The reluctance of the Court to declare sex discrimination in selection
of jurors as violative of the fourteenth amendment is further revealed
in Alexander v. Louisiana'50 where the Court refused to even treat the
question. In Alexander, the defendant had been convicted of rape
and challenged the grand jury selection procedures of the State of
Louisiana alleging that they discriminated against black males and all
women. The Louisiana procedures absolutely exempted women from
jury service unless they filed a written waiver of the exemption. De-
spite the urging of Justice Douglas, who was of the opinion that the
claim of sex discrimination should be reached and decided,1 5 1 the
Court held that the jury selection procedures were racially discrimina-
tory and reversed the conviction on that ground alone. Armed with
these and other precedents,' 52 courts have continued to uphold state
statutes granting women absolute exemptions absent waiver, on the
ground that the legislative distinction made was reasonable.'
5 3
Even at the time Hoyt v. Florida was decided, three states did not
permit women to sit on juries at all."' In White v. Crook, 55 male
and female residents of Lowndes County, Alabama, sued the jury com-
mission and other state officials in a class action, alleging that the jury
selection procedures of the state violated the Equal Protection Clause
because black males and all females were systematically excluded
from service.
The court held that the systematic exclusion of women from jury
service was an unreasonable classification under the fourteenth amend-
ment in view of modem political, social and economic conditions.
"[Tjhe conclusion is inescapable that the complete exclusion of wo-
men from jury service in Alabama is arbitrary."' 58
The decision in White does not alter the thrust of Hoyt and Alex-
ander. Where women have been granted absolute exemptions absent
waiver, as opposed to blanket exclusions from jury service, courts con-
tinue to adhere to the precedents set by the Court. But Fay and
Hoyt, resting as they do upon traditional assumptions regarding the
150. 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
151. id. at 634 [Douglas, J., concurring].
152. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
153. See United States v. Caci, 401 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. den. 394 U.S.
917 (1969); Leighton v. Goodman, 311 F. Supp. 1181 (S.D. N.Y. 1970); State v. Hall,
187 So.2d 861 (Miss. 1966), appeal dismissed 385 U.S. 98 (1966).
154. Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57,
62, n. 5 (1961).
155. 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
156. Id. at 408.
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role of women in society, are at least open to question. 157
Despite the tolerance with which the Court has viewed state schemes
which exempt women from jury duty, it has been considerably less
lenient within the federal sphere. 158 The Federal Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968159 expressly prohibits the exclusion of women as
a group from jury service and invalidates selection schemes which do
not adhere to the letter ot the Act, 60 or discretionary exclusions
based on judicial determinations of fitness for service.
For example, in Abbott v. Mines,16' the plaintiff sued a doctor in
a malpractice action after contracting cancer of the penis, groin and
other areas of his body. The trial court had excluded women from
the jury on the ground that the proceedings would be distasteful to
women. On appeal, the court held that such a wholesale exclusion of
women was not permitted by federal law and that women could be ex-
empted only upon their individual request from a trial involving dis-
tasteful subject matter.
Jury service is a form of participation in the governmental process,
a responsibility and a right that must be shared by all citizens, regard-
less of sex.' 62 The denial of the right to sue for loss of consortium
may be viewed as an overt form of discrimination based upon tradi-
tional assumptions regarding relations between men and women. Sex
discrimination in jury service, however is a more subtle form of discrim-
ination which denies women the duty of participation in the process of
self-government.
The exemption of women from jury service based upon outmoded
assumptions regarding sex roles carries the same constitutional infirmi-
ties as exist in complete exclusions from service. The Federal Jury
Selection and Service Act of 1968 can serve as the guide for the re-
quirement that the duty to serve on juries rests on an equal basis upon
all citizens regardless of sex.'6 " Ratification of the Equal Rights
157. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 641 (1972) [Douglas, J., concurring].
158. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
159. 82 STAT. 53, PL 90-274, § 101 (1968), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1948).
160. See United States v. Zirpolo, 450 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1971), where the court
invalidated a selection scheme providing for a two to one ratio of males to females in
grand jury selection.
161. 411 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1969).
162. White, supra 251 F. Supp. 401, 408 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Abbott, supra, 411 F.2d
353, 355 (6th Cir. 1969). See also Pendergraft v. Cook, 446 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1971).
163. Under this view, discretionary exemptions such as that suggested in Abbott v.
Mines, supra note 161, should be found unreasonable. The "distastefulness" of the
subject matter of the trial, by itself, is not a reasonable criterion for exemption since the
judgment as to what is distasteful rests upon traditional assumptions regarding sex
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Amendment would ensure that jury exemption procedures for women,
whether exclusionary or discretionary, be invalidated as arbitrary and
unreasonable denials of equality of treatment on account of sex.
3. Compulsory Military Service
The principle of equal treatment under law embodied in the basic
language of the Equal Rights Amendment requires that men and wo-
men not only be accorded equal rights and privileges, but also that
they be subject to the same responsibilities, burdens and duties of citi-
zenship. One of the basic duties of citizenship-the duty to serve in
the armed forces of the United States-has traditionally been limited
to male citizens.'
Despite the urgings of commentators and litigants, the courts have
been unwilling to second guess the legislative wisdom of the classifica-
tion made in compulsory military service. In United States v. St.
Clair,6' the defendant was charged with failing and refusing to submit
to registration under the Military Selective Service Act. On appeal,
the defendant raised the claim that the Act was unconstitutional in
that it made an invidious discrimination on the basis of sex in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment Due Process Clause. The court disagreed,
stating:
In the Act and its predecessors, Congress made a legislative
judgment that men should be subject to involuntary induction but
that women, presumably because they are "still regarded as the
center of home and family life" . . . should not. Women may
constitutionally be afforded "special recognition", . . . particularly
since women are not excluded from service in the Armed Forces.
. . . For these reasons, the distinction between men and women
with respect to service in the Armed Forces is not arbitrary, un-
reasonable or capricious. 166
The reluctance of the courts to interfere with Congressional judg-
ment is further expressed in United States v. Cook,6 7 where the de-
fendant was prosecuted for failure to report for induction. In response
to the allegation that the Selective Service Act was unconstitutional be-
cause it discriminated against males, the court found
roles. Equality in the duty to serve on juries certainly includes service in trials where
the subject matter of the trial may be distasteful to many citizens, both male and female.
164. See 50 U.S.C. App. 453 (1964).
165. 291 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
166. Id. at 124, 125.
167. 311 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1970). See also Simmons v. United States, 406
F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1969), where the issue of sex discrimination in the selection of draft
boards of appeal was raised but ignored by the court.
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[w]hile each of the sexes has its own innate characteristics, for
the most part physical strength is a male characteristic, and so
long as this is so, the United States will be compelled to establish
and maintain armed forces of males which may at least physically
be equal to the armed forces of other nations, likewise composed of
males, with which it must compete. 168
Whether women should be subject to compulsory military service is
an emotional issue. 169 Considerable diversity of opinion exists as to
the effectiveness of women as combatants, and the impact on the ef-
fectiveness of male soldiers due to the presence of female soldiers.
Without attempting to resolve these difficult issues, it is clear that the
drafting of women into the armed services on an equal basis with men
will have a substantial impact on the structure of the American mili-
tary system and on related areas which military service affects.
Because the concept of equal protection has its origin in the four-
teenth amendment, it is not applicable to the federal government. 7 '
This fact has forced litigants to rely on the fifth amendment Due Proc-
ess Clause for challenges to the Selective Service Act on the ground of
sex discrimination. Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment
would at least compel the courts to view sex discrimination in compul-
sory military service from the standpoint of equal protection. More-
over, the Amendment is specifically applicable to the federal govern-
ment.
Viewed through the prism of the reasonableness test anticipated un-
der the proposed Amendment and against the background of the
movement toward sexual equality, the spectrum of future decisions
may be radically different from St. Clair and Cook. Any system
which makes an arbitrary distinction as to who must serve in the mili-
tary does an injustice both to the individual who is denied the oppor-
tunity to serve and to the individual upon whom the burden falls more
heavily.17' If the time has arrived when protective concepts must
yield to equality of treatment under law, the Equal Rights Amendment
will provide the vehicle for change in the area of compulsory military
service.
4. Summation
Equality of treatment under law requires that men and women be
168. Id. at 622.
169. Hale and Kanowitz, Women and the Draft: A Response to Critics of the Equal
Rights Amendment, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 199, 200 (1971).
170. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
171. Hale and Kanowitz, supra note 169, at 220.
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subject to the same rights and duties of citizenship. The apparent
failure of courts to invalidate discriminatory practices which limit
rights and unequally apportion duties prevents the attainment of full
equality of citizenship. Even more than in the areas of employment
and preferential treatment, sex discrimination in rights and duties of
citizenship is rooted in traditional assumptions regarding the roles
men and women are expected to play in society. The Equal Rights
Amendment will require that these traditional assumptions be re-evalu-
ated in light of evolving concepts of sexual equality.
The language of the Amendment leaves no doubt that sex discrimi-
nation in the rights and duties of citizenship is unreasonable. The
beginning steps made by courts in the areas of loss of consortium ac-
tions and jury service will serve as guidelines for initiation of a firm
policy of equal treatment without regard to sex. The Equal Rights
Amendment will ensure the adoption of this policy in the rights and
duties incident to citizenship.
CONCLUSION
The law in areas where sex discrimination exists is currently under-
going considerable judicial scrutiny and re-evaluation. Many courts,
in response to the demands of men and women for equal treatment,
have begun to re-assess traditional assumptions regarding sex-roles in
light of evolving social concepts.
Notwithstanding the presence of productive judicial activity in the
analysis of discriminatory treatment of men and women in employ-
ment, rights and duties of citizenship and societal practices, considera-
ble sex discrimination continues to exist in every facet of modem life.
Men and women face sexually discriminatory laws and practices which
range from control of property to sex preference. Since the manifest
design of the Equal Rights Amendment is to prohibit sex discrimina-
tion where it is deemed unreasonable, ratification of the Amendment
can be expected to have a pervasive impact on every area in which sex
discrimination exists.
In addition to the various forms of sex discrimination under current
judicial review, the Amendment will serve as the basis for challenges
to such diverse areas of sex discrimination as: criminal statutes which
define crimes on the basis of unreasonable sex classifications or out-
worn assumptions regarding sex roles;' 72 domestic relation laws which
172. For example: prostitution; rape; obscene and vulgar language in the presence
of women. See generally Brown, supra note 4, at 954.
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inhibit the growth of a marriage as an equal partnership; 173 legal pro-
cedures which place inpediments in the path of litigants on the basis
of traditional assumptions regarding rights and duties; 174 rules and
regulations which prevent the attainment of educational or employ-
ment opportunities due to reliance on sexual stereotypes;175 and socie-
tal practices grounded in unsubstantiated assumptions regarding sex
norms or mores which have as their bases traditional moral or religious
doctrines.1 76  The application of the Amendment in eradicating these
forms of sex discrimination, in sum, will be as far-reaching as are the
areas.
Unlike the other methods proposed by advocates of sexual equality,
the Amendment will result in a re-interpretation of the entire concept
of classification of persons on the basis of sex. This interpretation will
necessarily disregard prior sexual stereotypes. As the vehicle for social
change, the Equal Rights Amendment may be the herald of an en-
tirely new era in which legal policy is oriented toward equality of treat-
ment of all persons without regard to sex and freedom from discrim-
ination on the basis of sex. Nevertheless, as with other major changes
in legal and social policy, it will remain for the courts to implement
new policies and fashion them into the intricate design of the law as it
presently exists.
Bearing the mandate of the overwhelming majority of the American
states, the Equal Rights Amendment will be the touchstone for the
173. For example: loss of name by married women; control of marital property by
husband only; interspousal tort immunity; alimony. See Hughes, And Then There Were
Two, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 233 (1971); Grant, How Much of a Partnership is Marriage?,
23 HASTINGS L.J. 249 (1971); Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23
HASTINGs L.J. 259 (1971); Brown, at 936. As to retention of given name by a married
woman, see Stuart v. Board of Supervisors, 41 U.S.L.W. 2218 (Md. Ct. App. Oct. 9
1972).
174. See Nonresident Taxpayers Association of Pennsylvania v. Murray, 41 U.S.L.W.
2135 (E.D. Pa. August 22, 1972). For an analysis of the successes and failures of
women as criminal defendants, personal injury plaintiffs and divorce litigants, see Nagel
and Weitzman, Women as Litigants, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 171 (1971).
175. See Note, Union Liability For Sex Discrimination, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 295 (1971);
Ginsburg, Treatment of Women By The Law: Awakening Consciousness in the Law
Schools, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 480 (1971).
176. For example: abortions; homosexuality; male orientation of the English lan-
guage. See Nagan, Social Perspectives: Abortion and Female Behavior, 6 VAL. U. L.
REV. 286 (1972); Note, The Abortion Controversy: The Law's Response, 48 CHi. KENT
L. REV. 191 (1971). With regard to the area of "sex preference", see McConnell v.
Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809 (D.Minn. 1970), rev'd, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971); Gayer
v. Laird, 332 F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1971); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d
185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed 41 U.S.L.W. 3167 (Oct. 10, 1972). As to the
problem of the male orientation of the English language, see Miller and Swift, De-
Sexing The English Language, Ms. MAGAZINE, Spring, 1972; Hodgson v. Career Counsel-
lors International, Inc., 41 U.S.L.W. 2240 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1972).
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courts in the examination of the reasonableness of sex-based classifica-
tions. As a constitutional expression of the necessity for equality of
treatment between men and women, the Amendment will force the
courts to invalidate previously accepted societal practices and legal
classifications which rested upon traditional assumptions regarding sex-
roles. The Amendment will require that the courts accept the modem
concept of sexual equality as the underlying operative principle of the
reasonableness test used to examine classifications made on the basis
of sex. In the final analysis then, the Equal Rights Amendment will
serve as the practical judicial tool the courts will use to attain the goal
of equality of rights without regard to sex.
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